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BAR BRIEFS

(d) Relative Irresponsibility: This is not often mentioned. But
it has no basis. For "irresponsibility," substitute "independence."
The very anonymity of a verdict, and the prompt fading away of the
jurors into the community mass, gives the individual juror a mental
and moral freedom to believe and to say, "That witness X is a liar,"
which the judge never could have; for the judge would have to write
it down in his opinion, in black and white, for all to read forever.
5. Demerits Inherent and Not Remediable

There seems to be only one charge that belongs here:
(a) Hardship to Citizens by Attendance as Jurors: This is a
different thing from the needless waste of time in attendance, that is
remediable. This charge emphasizes the unavoidable sacrifice of the
citizen in leaving his occupation during the two weeks of attendance,
once in three or four years. (Let us assume, of course, that by reason
of reforming the system, so as to meet the seasonal convenience of the
citizen, the hardship has been reduced to the minimum.)
It is astonishing to find this charge expressed in the following
bold nakedness: "A busihess magnate can't afford to abandon transactions which may involve millions to help . . . in a series of petty

disputes." Well, the magnate who would express such a view to the
lawyer who published it is precisely the kind of person who would
say to the lawyer, if we had judge trial, "How much will it cost us to
buy that judge's opinion ?"
Contrast with' that anti-social attitude this famous passage from
Jeremy Bentham: "Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of
Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the
same coach while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in
dispute about a halfpenny worth of apples,,and the chimney-sweeper
or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon them for their
evidence, could they refuse it? No most certainly." All that Democracy means is symbolized in the duty of the citizen to contribute a
small occasional sacrifice for the'doing of justice to his fellow citizens.
Military duty, witness duty, jury-duty--all stand on the same footing;
and the jury-duty is the most equable in its burdens. So much, then,
for the demerits of jury trial. Whatever the value of the opinions
here expressed, the scheme of analysis here offered seems to afford
the proper basis for a program for trial of jury trial.
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Chicago Cash Store vs. Bender: Plaintiff had store at Regent.
Defendant contracted to ship a carload of grapes delivered f.o.b. on
cars from Shafter, California. Plaintiff contends that defendant warranted grapes would be in good condition on arrival at Regent. From
a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Specifications of error
involve instructions to the jury. HXLD: Reversed. Where fruit is
sold f.o.b. at place of production, delivery to carrier acts as transfer
of title to buyer unless contrary intent clearly appears. In the instan'
cause where undisputed evidence shows transfer of title to buyer on
delivery to carrier, it was error to submit to the jury the question of
place of transfer of title.-A. E. A.
George vs. Odenthal: Both parties were farmers. Plaintiff set
a straw stack (old butt) on fire, after guarding against escape by burning a strip of prairie (9o feet) to a prairie road, the north, east and
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west sides being plowed or disced land. He did not extinguish the fire,
which appeared to have died out by noon of the third day. While at
lunch that day a violent northwest wind came along, and soon after
smoke and fire appeared near another straw butt located about 150
feet south of the one to which fire had been set. The fire spread with
the wind, destroyed considerable of plaintiff's property near by. Defendant alleged contributory negligence by reason the fact that plaintiff kept large quantities of straw over and around some of his buildings, and also relied upon Sections 2791 and 2792 C. L. 1913. HELD:
Sections 2797 and 2798 C. L. 1913 are controlling.

These Sections

"impose a rule of absolute liability upon him who starts a fire, however proper its purpose may be, and leaves it unextinguished so that
it escapes and spreads" and thereafter does damage. "These Sections
impose a duty to extinguish any fire that may. be made."
Olson vs. Wetzstein: Defendant, operating a passenger bus, collided with plaintiff's car, destroying the car. The testimony is conflicting as to negligence. Plaintiff sustained a fracture of the arm,
and other bruises. Testimony of three doctors shows normal recovery
of fracture with possible ten per cent limitation of motion of arm a
year later. Doctor and hospital bills show at $ioo, loss of time proved
about three months. Nothwithstanding findings of doctors, plaintiff
testified to continued pain and loss of strength. The examination by
the third physician was made at time of trial, about three years after
accident, and his finding was "no disability." Defendant attempted to
prove negligence on part of plaintiff, counterclaiming for $2oo damage
to bus. HELD: Evidence established defendant's liability, and that jury's
verdict of $4,031.8o is not excessive.

The definite proof shows $6oo

for loss of time, $300 for the automobile, $ioo for medical and hospital expense; "just why defendants should limit pain and suffering
to $5oo is not clear; pain and suffering are not measured by any set
monetary standard, for there is no market price for such conditions;
it may be the jury was fairly liberal in its allowance, but this matter
is for the jury to determine." (N. B.-This case is cited for the reason
that it illustrates that one point, that there is no market value for pain
and suffering. Every definite fact discloses justification for being
aggrieved at the verdict. There was normal recovery, without complications through infection, etc., and the final result shows no permanent disability. Whether or not one agrees that the Court should not interfere in a case that discloses normal recovery, normal result and no
"unusual" pain and suffering, under all of the medical findings, this
fact is clear: that the estimates of juries in such cases are haphazard,
unscientific guesses.)
Watland vs. Workmen's Compensation Bureau: Arose on demurrer, hence facts taken from complaint. They are: that plaintiffs,
co-partners, intended to comply with compensation law, and authorized
manager, about July I,

19i9,

to pay premium; that blanks were re-

quested from bureau; that blanks were mailed plaintiffs shortly after;
that plaintiffs filled them out; that no order to pay premium followed
upon return of blanks to bureau; that in November, i919, plaintiffs
again wrote bureau; that February i, 1920, bureau sent out statement
of premium and pay-in-order; that February 12, 1920, plaintiffs mailed
the amount demanded, $52.J6; that, in the meantime, an employee of
plaintiffs was injured (February 2, '1920); that injured person filed
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claim with the bureau; that bureau held there was no insurance at time
of injury, and entered award against plaintiffs; that plaintiffs, after
suit on the award, denied liability on ground that the injury was not
in course of employment; judgment was entered against plaintiffs for
$2,5oo and 5o% penalty; that, on appeal to Supreme Court, the penalty
was stricken out; that plaintiffs paid judgment, totalling $3,000, in
1925, which is damage claimed against defendant. HELD: "The Compensation Bureau may not be regarded as a legal entity for the purpose
of suit, and a suit against it is in legal effect a suit against the State ;"
that neither the limited right of appeal provided in the Compensation
Act, nor Section 8175 of the Laws of 1913, support plaintiff's contention. The statement: "With reference to the Workmen's Compensation Fund the statute expressly authorized suit to be brought against
the officers charged with the duty of administering the law," found. in
Wirtz vs. Nestos, 51 N. D. 626, is also explained, as referring to appeals and not to original actions.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
An employee, on business for his employer, was traveling in an
auto at a speed of 40 to 50 miles per hour as he approached a railroad
crossing. He collided with a train and was killed. A special statute
prohibited the operation of cars in such cases at more than io miles
per hour, and the compensation law provided that no compensation
was payable for injury or death due to "willful misconduct or willful
failure or refusal to perform a duty required by statute." HELD:
That the employee's acts would not prevent recovery by his dependents.
There must be affirmative evidence in addition to the mere omission
or failure to take statutory precautions, and mere negligence is not sufficient to show willfulness and wantonness.-Carroll vs. Insurance
Co., 146 S. E. 788 (Georgia, Dec. 1928).
A large rock in a coal mine had been exposed or loosened by a
charge of dynamite. The next morning an employee, working near the
place, was told "that it was a very dangerous rock, to be sure and take
it down, and not to work under it." The compensation law provided
that compensation was not payable in case of willful misconduct.
Acting on his own judgment, after the instruction, the employee undertook to support the rock with timber and then proceeded -with the loading of coal. The rock fell, killing him. HELD: The willful and deliberate disobedience of the order amounted to such "willful misconduct" as is contemplated by the statute, and compensation was properly
denied.-Collins vs. Collieries, 13 S. W. (2nd) 332 (Tennessee, Feb.
1929).

The Texas Penal Code prohibits the employment of minors under

17 in a mine, quarry or place where explosives are used. Another Sec-

tion prohibits employment of minors under 15 more than 8 hours a day
or 48 hours a week. A road construction crew employed a boy under
15 as errand boy 1O hours a day. Explosives were handled, but the
boy was always remoed to a safe place. Evidence indicated that the
parents of the boy also worked for the same employer. The boy was
killed, but not in connection with the use of explosives. HEL~n: The
liability of the insurance carrier is contractual. The contract is for the
benefit of lawful employees. There is no cause of action against the
insurance carrier (workmen's compensation). The only cause of
action is against the employer.-Aetna Ins. Co. vs. Gilley, 12 S. W.

